eIDAS 2.0, QWACs And The Security Of The Web

Tension has been high in the past months regarding a proposed change to the European eIDAS regulation which defines trust services, digital identity, and the so-called QWACs – qualified website authentication certificates. The proposal aims at making sure that EU-issued certificates are recognized by browsers. Here’s a summary from Scott Helme, and a discussion with Troy Hunt, and another good post by Eric Rescorla, former Firefox CTO so I’ll skip the intro.


Early in the process, Mozilla issued a position paper that raises some issues with the proposal. One of them is that what the EU suggests is basically an Extended Validation certificate – something that we had in the past (remember the big green address bars?), and which we have abandoned some time ago, and for a reason – multiple studies found that they do not bring any benefits. The EU says “QWACs (EVs) give the user more trust because they know which legal entity is behind a given website”. And the expert community says “well, in which scenario is that useful, and what about faking it – opening an entity with the same name in a different jurisdiction?”.

Later in the process, an additional limitation was added for browser vendors – that they cannot mandate additional security requirements than those specified by the EU standards body – ETSI. This is, to me, counterintuitive policy-wise, because in general, you set minimum requirements in regulations, not maximum. Of course, this prevents browser vendors from having arbitrary requirements. Not that they’ve had such requirements per se, but for example their CA inclusion page says “Mozilla is under no obligation to explain the reasoning behind any inclusion decision.” For me, this is not an acceptable process for something as important.

Mozilla (and various experts) also note, correctly, that if a CA gets compromised, this affects the entire world – the traffic to any website can be sniffed through man-in-the-middle attacks. And this has happened before. The Electronic Frontier Foundation, a respected digital rights organization, also objected to the approach.

Then Mozilla launched a campaign website against the amendment, which has the wrong tone and has some gross oversimplifications and factually incorrect statements (for example, it’s not true that QTSPs are not independently vetted). Then the European Signature Dialog (basically, an association of EU CAs, called QTSPs – qualified trust service providers), responded to it in a similarly inappropriate way. It said “Mozilla is generally perceived as a Google satellite, paving the way for Google to push through its own commercial interests” (which is false, but let’s not go into that).

The statements that QWACs are better against phishing, is arguably not true, even if you consult the paper that the ESD linked. It says: “Our analysis shows that it is generally impossible to differentiate between benign sites and phishing sites based on the content of their certificates alone. However, we present empirical evidence that current phishing websites for popular targets do typically not replicate the issuer and subject information”. So the fact that phishing sites don’t bother using EVs is somehow a reasons that EVs(QWACs) help against phishing? I’m disappointed by this ESD piece – they know better. Mozilla also knows better, as this negative campaign website introduces a tone that’s not constructive.

Insufficient assessment

What becomes apparent from the impact assessment study, another study, and the subsequent impact assessment is that there have been efforts to agree with browser vendors on including EU issued certificates without the CAs having to go through the root program process of the browsers, which they have refused.

I think this is not a good impact assessment. It does not assess impact. It doesn’t try to find out what will happen once this is passed, nor it tries to compare root programs with current ETSI standards to find the gaps. Neither the initial study, nor the impact assessment review the security aspects of the change.

For example, due the current usage patterns of QWACs for internal API-based communication between EU institutions, QWACs have sometimes been issued to private addresses (e.g. 192.186.xx.xx). Once they become automatically approved by the browsers, a security risk arises – what if I have a trusted certificate for your local router IP?

Also, it’s not a good process to include additional limitations in the trialogue, which is an informal process between the EU parliament, commission and council. I, as a Bulgarian member of parliament, requested from our government the drafts from the trialogue, and I was not granted access (due to EU rules). This is unacceptable as a legislative process, which should be fully transparent.

I have criticized this process and insufficient impact assessments before – for the copyright directive introduction of a requirement for automated content takedown, and for the introduction of mandatory fingerprints in ID cards.. There just doesn’t seem to be enough technical justification for regulations that have a very significant technical impact – not just in the EU, but in the world (as browsers have a global trusted CA list, not a EU one).

Technical or political debate?

The debate, as it seems, has conflated two separate issues – the technical and the political one. What Mozilla (and I presume other browser vendors) are implying is that they are responsible for the security in their browsers and they should be able to enforce security rules, while the EU is saying – private US entities (for-profit or non-profit) cannot have full control over who gets trusted and who doesn’t. Both are valid arguments. The EU seems to be pursuing a digital sovereignty agenda here, which, strategically, is a good idea.

But the question is whether that’s the best approach, and if not – how to improve it.

Some data and an anecdote to further illustrate the status quo. The Certinomis French QTSP (CA) has been distrusted by Mozilla a while ago. It is, however, on the EU trusted list. With the changes, Mozilla and others should re-trust it. The concerns raised by Mozilla seem legitimate, and so the fact that EU conformity assessment bodies do regular audits may not be sufficient for the purposes of web security (but this assumption needs to also be critically assessed).

Currently, there are 146 root/subordinate CA certificates listed for QWAC QTSPs. Of those 146, 115 are included in one or more root trust stores, and between 57 and 80 are missing from one or more. It’s far from an ideal picture, but these numbers should have been in the impact assessment and the problem statement in the first place. So that the legislators can identify the reasons for not including a CA in one or more root program. Is it a technical shortcoming of the CA, or it it a vendor discretion? Certainly, there doesn’t seem to be a ban on EU CAs/QTSPs by browser vendors.

So, essentially, the political results here is that EU CAs will get a fast-track into trust stores. I’m sure other jurisdictions will try to pass similar legislation, which will complicate the scene even further. Some of them will not be as democratic as the EU. And if a browser vendor thinks some CA is not trustworthy by their standards, they may come up with very clever workarounds of the regulation.

The first one – ignoring it, as there are no fines. But they can also introduce different paddock colors for different cases – e.g. a QWAC from a browser-approved CA gets a green paddock, a QWAC that has not passed the browser root program gets a yellow paddock. Compared to the current grey one, the yellow color may be perceived as less trustworthy. And then we’ll have to argue whether yellow is a clear enough indication and whether it shows trust or not so much. Time and time again I have stated that you can’t really regulate exact features and UI.

A technical solution to the political question?

I’ve heard many times that technical solutions to political problems are wrong. And I’ve seen many cases where, if you delve into the right level of detail, there is a solution that is both technically good and serves the political goal. In this case this is the so-called “Certificate transparency”. In a nutshell, each certificate, before being issued, is placed in a public verifiable data structure (merkle tree – used in blockchain implementations), and gets a signed certificate timestamp (SCT) as a response, which is then included as an X.509 attribute. This mitigates the risk of compromised CAs issuing certificates for websites that do not belong to the one requesting the certificate. In no time (up to 24 hours) they will be caught and distrusted, which raises the bar significantly.

Unfortunately, ETSI hasn’t included Certificate transparency in the current QWAC standard. The ESD association mentioned above says in another document that “The Browsers can easily bring any additional rules they want to impose on QTSPs such as Certificate Transparency to ETSI and other international standards bodies to be adopted through an open process of consensus by the internet community”, which I think is the wrong approach – Certificate transparency is an IETF RFC and is a de-facto standard. What will surely help is moving it (they are actually 2 RFCs) out of the “Experimental” status in IETF, but we can’t require every standard to be mirrored by ETSI.

I don’t know why CT has not been referenced by ETSI so far. It’s true that certificate log servers are based mostly in the US (and one in China), but nothing stops an organization from running a CT log. It “just” takes some infrastructure and bandwidth to support the load, but I think it’s a price EU QTSPs can pay, e.g. by sharing the costs for a couple of CT logs.

As a sidenote, I think it’s worth noting that the EU can also do more towards the adoption of DANE – a standard, which gets rid of CAs, as the public key is stored in a DNS record. It relies on DNSSEC, which doesn’t have huge adoption yet, and both are trickier to implement than it sounds, but if we want to be independent from browser decisions on which CA to trust, we can remove CAs from the trust equation. I’m fully aware it’s far from simple, and we’ll have to support PKI/CAs for a long, long time, but it’s a valid policy direction – mandate DNSSEC and DANE support.


Certificate transparency requirements can be added now to the eIDAS Annex IV. We are too late in the legislation process for that to be done smoothly, but I’d appreciate if the legislative bodies tried it. It would be just one additional point – “(k) details about the inclusion of the certificate in a public ledger” (note that the same eIDAS 2.0 regulates ledgers, and a CT log is a ledger, so that can be leveraged).

If not in Annex IV, then I’d strongly suggest including CT in the next version of the relevant ETSI standard. And I think it would be good if the EU Commission or ETSI to do a gap analysis of current root programs and the current ETSI standards to see if something important is missing.

Furthermore, the European Commission should initiate a series of objective studies on the effectiveness of extended validation certificates. The studies that I’ve read are not in favour of the EV/QWAC approach, but if we are to argue EV/QWACs are worth it, we need better justification.

A compromise is possible, that would make browsers confident that there will be no rogue CAs while at the same time giving Europe a say over trust in the web.

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